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In his article, Labor Picketing, The Right To Protest, and the Neoliberal First Amendment, Professor Blum argues that
labor picketing, which has received diminished protection when viewed from the statutory lens of Section 8(b)(4) of the
National Labor Relations Act, would receive greater protection if viewed primarily through a constitutional lens. Blum
upfront acknowledges that many scholars—notably Cynthia Estlund, Catherine Fisk, Charlotte Garden, Michael Harper,
James Gray Pope, and Mark Schneider—as well as several practitioners have made similar arguments. (P. 600, n. 14.)
However, he brings a fresh approach to this important legal agenda by framing the problem not only as a legal
challenge but also from the union lawyers’ perspective, which he obtained through surveys and interviews. (Pp.
611–16.)
As a legal matter, Blum correctly notes that the halcyon days of labor picketing protection passed nearly eighty years
ago when the Supreme Court, in Thornhill v. Alabama, held that the state’s power to regulate labor picketing was
limited by the First Amendment’s free speech clause. But what the Justices giveth, the Justices may taketh away.
Thus, labor picketing could lose its constitutional protection: (1) if accompanied by violence, Milk Wagon Drivers Union
of Chicago, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc.; (2) if the speech targeted a neutral party, Carpenters and Joiners
Union of Am., Local No. 213 v. Ritter’s Cafe; or (3) if the picketing had unlawful objectives, Giboney v. Empire Storage
& Ice Co. During this time, the Court also began to view labor picketing as inherently involving conduct as well as
speech, and therefore subject to greater state regulation for that reason too.1 Indeed, by the time the Supreme Court
penned Int’l Bhd of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, the transformation of labor picketing to activity benefitting from less
than full constitutional protection was nearly complete.
As the surveyed union attorneys see it, the problem is multifaceted although it generally boils down to the fact that the
rules governing secondary activity are incoherent. This makes it difficult and time consuming to train union members on
the dos and don’ts of labor picketing. The abstruseness also undermines the ability of rank-and-file employees to act
concertedly. Indeed, Board investigators, among the most knowledgeable labor experts, themselves often
misunderstand the law and often presume that secondary picketing is unlawful even when it is not. These factors,
together with an outmoded and incorrect belief that all labor picketing is coercive, chills and limits secondary activity.
(Pp. 613–14.)
Blum next summarizes how legal prohibitions on secondary activity butt up against the First Amendment:
[N]ormally, as long as a group’s self-expression, including picketing, does not coerce the people they confront
through violence . . ., the First Amendment protects that expression. There is no basis for treating secondary
labor picketing, a form of union self-expression, any differently from any other kind of picketing, whether the
target is primary, secondary, or both . . . . Like other forms of picketing, labor picketing is not inherently coercive
of its audience, and any coercion by picketers should, under the First Amendment, be addressed through
narrowly tailored restrictions. (Pp. 616–17.)
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From here, Blum turns to recent developments in First Amendment jurisprudence, agreeing with scholars that
decisions like Citizens United v. FEC and Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc. facilitate the analysis that the NLRA’s ban on
secondary picketing is unconstitutional. (P. 631.) Nevertheless, Blum warns unions against buying into this Court’s
neoliberal construction of the First Amendment:
It is fair enough to say that what is good for the goose, in this case, corporate and/or commercial speech, is
good for the gander, i.e., labor speech. However, it would be a strategic error for labor to rely on these
decisions in seeking to strike that ban under the First Amendment. Although the distinction between political
and economic speech cannot be sustained, the First Amendment distinction between social movement,
including labor, speech on the one hand and profit-motivated speech on the other can and should be sustained
and breaking down that distinction has undesirable consequences for the labor movement and its constituents.
(Pp. 638–39.)

Here, Blum offers three reasons unions should resist the temptation of relying on commercial or corporate speech
decisions to extend greater protections to secondary boycott activity. First, the distinction between labor and
commercial speech is “valid” because “[t]here is an essential difference between speech that proposes a commercial
transaction in the marketplace and speech that defies market logic by insisting that human labor not be treated simply
as a commodity.” (P. 639.) Second, the Court has never characterized labor speech as commercial speech and has,
indeed, treated the two categories of speech very differently. (P. 642.) The distinguishing features of these two
categories of speech “demonstrate why there are compelling societal interests, rooted in knowledge and power
differentials, in regulating commercial and corporate speech that do not apply to other kinds of speech.” (P. 639.) In
Blum’s view, “[u]nions should advance those compelling interests and defend the state’s regulatory authority, both to
protect the state’s ability to regulate labor relations and to defend regulatory systems that protect unions’ members
and broader constituencies.” Id. Third, labor does not need to rely on these decisions because other avenues of First
Amendment protection are available. Id.
This article continues the important debate on how the law should treat worker self-expression. Labor advocates for
more than a century have advocated for treating workers as humans who possess dignity rather than as factors of
production. The law’s dignification of workers was short-lived and coincided with New Deal legislation. With the rise of
the neoliberal paradigm of the late twentieth century and its law-and-economics judicial framework, the law returned to
a labor-as-commodity lens. Accordingly, it is tempting to engage in a can’t-beat-them-join-them strategy as
commercial and corporate speech has gained increasingly robust constitutional protection. However, as Blum points
out, that strategy is inauthentic and sells out the worker qua human. Buying into this paradigm is dangerous because it
transgresses every human rights value for which labor advocates have fought in exchange for a possible short-term
gain. Blum’s vision allows for transformational change, rejecting the incremental breadcrumbs that Citizens United and
Sorrell offer. Once those crumbs are accepted, labor is cabined. Workers, as humans who possess human rights
deserve more than crumbs. Blum reminds us that our duty, as labor advocates, is to transform that neoliberal paradigm
to one that treats workers with the human dignity that justly deserve.
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